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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

EvaluatingHuman Rightsin Africa:
Some Problemsof ImplicitComparisons
RhodaHoward

Since the 1970s, many humanistically minded academics have become concerned with the comparative measurement and analysis of human rights.
The new concern is partly a result of the introduction of human rights as a
subject of United Nations debates and foreign policy deliberations, especially in the United States during the CarterAdministration (1977-81). Frequently, on the intergovernmental and national levels, the debate is nothing
more than a new means of rhetoric, with an additional patina of moral concern, for asserting a nation-state's normal national security interests.
In the United Nations and other such fora, a favorite tactic of debate is
to compare one's own country's human rightsstrengths with another country's human rights weaknesses. Thus socialist countries criticize the lack of
welfare security in capitalist countries, while the latter reply with an indictment of the lack of civil liberties in the former. Former imperialist powers
criticize the human rights practices of their former colonies. Developed
countries and underdeveloped countries are also compared, almost inevitably to the latters' disadvantage. Finally, since no country has completely
lived up to the United Nations ideal as embodied in the InternationalBillof
Rights,' it is fair game for adversaries to hold up that ideal as a mirror to
reflect human rights abuses.
In this paper, I illustratethe problems of how implicit human rightscomparisons affect one's evaluations of human rightsperformance, by discussing
1. The International Bill of Human Rights comprises three sets of standards. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948; G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976; G.A. Res.
2200 A (XXI),21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976; G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI),21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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the kinds of comparisons to which Africa is often subject. I refer for factual
examples to a select group of sub-SaharanAfrican countries, namely, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zambia - all (presently or formerly) English-speakingcountries, colonized by
the United Kingdom, which obtained their independence in the early 1960s.
In the course of my research 2 on human rights in these countries, I have
become aware that my evaluation of their performance depends partly on
my implicit comparisons with performance in other times and places. If I
judge the nine countries against the human rights ideal as expressed in the
InternationalBillof Rights,they fare quite poorly. They fare quite poorly also
if I compare them with developed Western democracies or with their
"mother country," Britain, in the contemporary period. But if I compare
them with the now-developed world as it was two or three hundred years
ago, i.e., at a similar"state"of economic development and nation-building,
they fare much better. If I compare them with themselves under the colonial
period, they also fare quite well. If I compare them with themselves in their
own political-cultural past (in the precolonial period), the evaluation is
mixed.
One needs, then, to be aware of the comparisons one is making. All
evaluations of human rights in specific nation-states contain implicit comparisons, either with some philosophical and judicial ideal or with human
rights in selected other nation-states. Comparisons are useful: they can help
to measure realizations as well as abuses of human rights and to come up
with realistic assessments of what is possible and probable. An historical
sense will facilitate measurement of past progress and will make predictions
possible. Social or cultural comparisons will facilitate a sense of how needs,
wants, and rights are reinterpreted as societies change; such comparisons
will also remove the stress from ethnic or regional peculiarities (e.g.,
"African"versus "Western")and instead stress similaritiesand differences of
social organization.
I illustrate below how one's implicit evaluations of human rights in
English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa can change, depending on the comparison one makes.

COMPARING HUMAN RIGHTSIN AFRICAWITH THE IDEAL
The internationally recognized ideal of human rights is the International Bill
of Rights, a package of rights which has been progressively defined by the
United Nations since 1948. As is well known, the two 1966 Covenants pro2. See Rhoda Howard, "The Dilemma of Human Rights in Sub-SaharanAfrica,"International
Journal 35 (Autumn 1980), 724-747, and other references below.
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vide the basic list of rights in the international human rights package,
although a number of supplementary instruments elaborate specific rights.3
The criticisms of the practice of deriving human rights ideals from
United Nations standards are well-known. First, United Nations practice in
enumerating lists of rightsis hardlythat of an independent, unbiased body of
thinkers. The United Nations is a political body which is not universal, even
in 1983, in its membership. At the time the Universal Declaration was formulated, the Third World carried considerably less influence within the
organization than it does today. The two Covenants derived from the
Declaration were products of the Cold War era; thus, especially at the urgings of the United States (which has yet to ratifyeither Covenant), so-called
civil and political rights were split off from so-called economic, social, and
cultural rights.4Aside from these obvious political biases, United Nations
practice can result in selective internationalcondemnation of some regimes,
e.g., South Africa, but nary a slap on the hand for others, e.g., Amin's
Uganda.s
These biases in the formulation of ideals are reflected in the actual content of the Covenants. Africans frequently draw attention to the imbalance
between expecting immediate implementation of civil and political rights
(Civil-PoliticalCovenant, Article 3), but only gradual implementation of
economic, social, and cultural rights (Economic-Social-CulturalCovenant,
Article 2(1)). Surely, many Africans argue, the latter rightsshould take priority over the former in their poverty-stricken, underdeveloped countries.6
The huge list of rights in the two covenants is also criticized: even within the
two categories the lists contain no priorities (other than the distinction
between those rights that are derogable in times of officially declared
national emergencies and those that are not [Civil-PoliticalCovenant, Article
4]). Hence the new interest in discussing both basic needs as an economic
strategy7 and basic rights as a political strategy. Should, for example, the
country which (without a national emergency) violates Article 25(b) of the
3. See generally Richard B. Lillich, International Human Rights Instruments (Buffalo, N.Y.:
William S. Hein Co., 1983).
4. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980), 6.
5. On the double standard with regard to violations of human rights in Africa, see Warren
Weinstein, "Africa'sApproach to Human Rights at the United Nations," Issue 6 (Winter
1976), 14-21, and A. Glenn Mower, Jr., "Human Rights in Black Africa: A Double Standard?"Human Rights Journal 9 (January-March 1976), 39-70.
6. For an eloquent statement on civil-political versus economic rights, see Julius K. Nyerere,
"Stabilityand Change in Africa"(an address at the University of Toronto, 1969), reprinted
in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record (London: Rex Collings), vol. 2
(1969-70), C30-31.
7. The World Bank is particularlyinterested in the basic-needs approach to development, as
numerous articles, especially in World Development, attest. See, e.g., Paul Streeten,
"Basic Needs and Human Rights,"World Development 8 (1980), 107-111, and Shahid
Javed Burkiand Mahbub UI Haq, "Meeting Basic Needs: An Overview," World Development 9 (1981), 167-182.
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Civil-PoliticalCovenant, regarding"genuine periodic elections," be criticized
as severely as the country which violates Article 7, regardingthe right not to
be tortured?Should the rightto work under Article 6 of the Economic-SocialCultural Covenant be as important as the right to eat under Article 11?
Yet it is somewhat specious to continue making the above criticisms of
biases in human rights standards in the 1980s; for in the 1970s, the Third
World members of the U.N. made a concerted effort to rectifythe perceived
bias toward political, as against economic, rights. The effort was successful,
indeed perhaps too successful, as there is now a general trend to assert that
political rights and civil liberties must wait until economic rights have been
realized.8 This trend can be seen most clearly in the calls for a New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.) beginning in 1974.9 The most important of
the numerous documents agreed upon since 1974 was a 1977 U.N. resolution, "Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United
Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms."10This resolution stated that equal attention ought
to be given to civil-political and economic-social-cultural rights.11It then
went on, however, to say that in the U.N. system, priority with regard to
human rightsought to be given to questions of national sovereignty 12 and to
the realization of the N.I.E.O.13Itfurther requested the U.N. Commission on
Human Rightsto accept these priorities, presumably over its other concerns.
Thus the U.N. system was deflected from investigating individual human
rightsin the civil and political sphere: the cynic might perhaps conclude that
Third World elites, by refocusing U.N. standard-setting activities onto the
realm of international inequalities, had preserved their own opportunities for
internal inequalities and denial of political rights.
Some Africans might well counter such a cynical interpretationby pointing out that there is, in their view, another inherent bias in the U.N. human
rights ideals, that of stressing individual over group rights. This criticism is
both political and cultural. Politically, it is based on the view that over the
last five centuries, the most immense, systematic, and brutal violations of
human rights in Africa have been those of the internationalslave trade, colonialism, and apartheid. Insofaras apartheid still exists and insofar as colonialism is perpetuated by allegedly neocolonial economic strategies, then in the
8. For my own views on this subject, see Rhoda Howard, "The Full-Belly Thesis: Should
Economic Rights Take Priorityover Civil and Political Rights?Evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa,"Human Rights Quarterly 5 (November 1983), 467-490.
9. U.N. General Assembly, "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order," Resolution 3201 (S-VI)of 1 May 1974 (General Assembly, 6th Special
Session), in U.N., Resolutions 14 (1972-74), 527-529.
10. U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 32/130 (1977), in U.N., Resolutions and Decisions (20
September-21 December 1977), Supp. 45, at 150-151.
11. Ibid., art. 1(a).
12. Ibid., art. 1(e).
13. Ibid., art. 1(f).
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African view the onus for rectifying human rights abuses in Africa lies
especially on the Western, developed world to compensate for past and
present injustices and inequalities. Culturally,the argument is that Africans
are not individualists, that they are much more group- or communityoriented than Westerners. Thus, Africans maintain, much of the CivilPolitical Covenant ought not to apply to them.
This African criticism of the U.N. ideal is now embodied in the 1981
African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights.14 The addition of peoples'
rights, even in the very title of this AfricanCharter, marks it off from all other
regional charters of rights, such as the European and American Conventions.15 If the African Charter is taken as the new, relevant ideal to which
practice in individual African states must adhere, then the African human
rights record will be substantially better than if it is compared with the U.N.
ideal.
There have been, for example, some severe ethnic persecutions in independent English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. These include Idi Amin's
appalling slaughter of specific ethnic groups such as the Acholi and the
Langi16 and the Kenyan persecution of ethnic Somalis in the 1960s.17 But,
overall, the cultural integrity of minority ethnic groups has been subject to
far less attack than one might expect of new nation-states, even in cases of
secessionism (the Igbo of Nigeria) or irredentism (the Ewe of Ghana 18). This
does not mean that such groups have suffered no prejudice or discrimination. The Nigerian civil war began after up to fifty thousand Igbo (Biafrans)
were slaughtered in the north in 1966. After the Biafransecessionists were
defeated in 1970, the Igbo were rapidly reintegrated into national life; but
they still suffer discrimination both from their former enemies and from
inhabitants of minority (non-lgbo) areas of eastern Nigeria.19There is no
14. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by the O.A.U. Summit at
Nairobi, Kenya, 27 June 1981; O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, rev. 5; reprinted in International Legal Materials 21 (1982), 58. [Editor'snote: see B. Obinna Okere, "The Protection
of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,"
Human Rights Quarterly, this issue.]
15. For an analysis of the African Charter and comparison with other regional charters, see
Okere, note 14 above, and Richard Gittleman, "The Banjul Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Ron I. Meltzer, eds.,
Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York
Press, 1984).
16. The Langi are the ethnic group to which Milton Obote, Amin's predecessor and successor, belongs. Foraccounts of the slaughter of these and other ethnic groups in Uganda,
see Africa Contemporary Record 4 (1971-72), B229, and id. 5-11 (1972-73 to 1978-79),
sections on Uganda.
17. Amnesty International, Annual Reports, "Kenya," 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69. In
February 1970, amnesty was granted to all political offenders in the North-EastProvince.
Africa Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), B128.
18. Africa Contemporary Record 6 (1973-74), B651; id. 7 (1974-75), B643; id. 8 (1975-76),
B696.
19. Id. 3 (1970-71), B415; id. 4 (1971-72), B646.
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guarantee that ethnic slaughter will not occur again in Nigeria, especially if
economic conditions continue to worsen. Similarlyin Ghana, the Ewe of the
Volta Region have long been used as ethnic scapegoats. Some Ewe leaders
were sentenced to death for subversion during the Acheampong military
regime (1972-79) in Ghana, but the sentences were never carried out.20
Nevertheless, rumors of Ewe conspiracies continue to circulate in Ghana in
the 1980s.
Despite these examples of severe ethnic conflict, one rarely finds in
Africa deliberate wholesale slaughter of ethnic groups (as, for example, the
slaughter of American Indians during the period of colonization of North
America), nor does one find concerted attempts to eliminate ethnic
languages or religious practices. The emphasis on group rightsin the African
ideal both reinforces the claims of African nation-statesvis-a-visthe Westerndominated world economy and encourages the rights of subnational
cultural groups within Africa.
Yet the African Rights Charter, like the U.N. standards, is a political
document, emanating from the Organization of African Unity, whose
Charter has itself been criticized for being little more than a formulation of
rightsfor heads of state.21 The African RightsCharter'sunderplaying of individual rights allows for considerable abuse of those rights enshrined in the
Civil-PoliticalCovenant. The question arises, therefore, which ideal is one to
choose as a basis for one's measurement of human rights guarantees or
abuses? Does one choose the "universal"U.N. package or the "specific"
African package? If one opts for specificity of rights, then to what are they
specific: to continent, to nation-state, to "race"or ethnic-cultural group? Can
generalizations about human rights be made outside of specificities of place,
time, and "level of development"?
Academics cannot limit their analyses of human rights to comparisons
with international human rights documents. Insofar as all of these
documents are essentially political treaties based on compromise and consensus (and indeed, some skeptics would argue, nation-states' guarantees
not to rock each others' respective boats), they are neither in the
philosophical nor the sociological sense universally valid documents.
Similarly,to criticize African or indeed any other national, regional, or continental human rightspractices on the bases of these documents is to beg the
question of whether human rights are culturally specific as well as the question of whether poor or newly developing countries may be held to the
20. Amnesty International, "Reporton the Death Penalty: Ghana" (1979). The Ewe prisoners,
sentenced in August 1976, were released in 1978.
21. See Charterof the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U. Charter),adopted 23 May 1963;
479 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963); reprinted in International Legal Materials 2 (1963), 766. Olajide
Aluko, "The Organisation of African Unity and Human Rights,"The Round Table 283 (July
1981), 240, quotes Kwame Nkrumah as having referred to the O.A.U. as "atrade union of
African presidents."
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same standards as wealthy, developed countries. Human rights abuses are
not merely the result of lack of political will or selfish unwillingness to give
up elite pleasures. Judgments must be historically based, must compare
groups at similar levels of social evolution or development, and must take
into account different cultural traditions.

COMPARINGAFRICAWITH WESTERNDEMOCRACIES
A second implicit comparison which African and Western scholars make is
evaluation of human rights in the Third World against human rights standards in Western democracies. In general, African and other Third World
countries fare quite poorly in such comparisons. Western democracies
allow high levels of individual civil and political rights,and can afford a high
level of social security guarantees of basic economic needs, as well as social
and cultural rights.
The evaluation of human rights in Africa in comparison with the U.N.
ideal can at least be justified on the ground that the U.N. standards represent
a minimum international moral consensus constantly being reevaluated and
adjusted as more ThirdWorld input into that forum augments understanding
of the peculiar constraints of economic underdevelopment and past political
colonialism. The U.N. ideal is just that, an ideal toward which Third World
nations can strive at a pace which takes into account their problems of
development. The Western comparison, on the contrary, is abstracted from
both history and economics. It presents as a matter of Western moral commitment and political will what is in fact a matter of enormous economic
advantage and centuries of class, ethnic, racial- and now sexual - conflict.
A common means which ThirdWorld nations employ to reply to what
they rightlyconsider to be unfair comparisons with Western nations in the
area of human rightsis to point out the deficiencies in human rightspractices
which still exist in Western democracies. Underlying these defensive
criticisms is a sense of the biases which still exist in the liberal ideal of human
rights, even though the original liberal ideal has been supplemented in the
last hundred years by a growing quasisocialist sense of the state's moral
burden to provide for basic welfare rights for all its citizens. The Western
world still stresses the rights of formal political participation and judicial
equality, emerging from the French and American revolutions, over the
rights of economic equality emerging from Marxism and the Soviet and
Chinese revolutions, as well as over the late twentieth-century concern for
new "solidarity"rights such as the right to peace and to a healthy environment. It also stresses, again, individual over group rights.
The differences in human rightsphilosophies of the ThirdWorld and the
Western world reflect not only differences in ideologies, but also differences
in historical experiences and in present forms of social organization. The
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Western stress on individual political liberties and rights under the law
emerged from the struggle of the capitalist bourgeoisie to assert its independence against the kings and feudal nobilities of early modern Europe.22The
mode of economic organization was individual ownership of land and
capital along with private employment of labor alienated from the means of
production. By contrast, in most new African states there is either a mixed
economy with a procapitalistbent, as in Nigeria;a heavily nationalized statecapitalist economy, as in Zambia; or a protosocialist economy, as in Tanzania.
The demands on these economies are heavy. Rapid decolonization in
the 1960s was accompanied by rash promises by the new political elites to
grant all of the economic demands which a "revolution of rising expectations" had generated among local populations. The economic expectations
of the newly freed masses who were the bases of the new elites' political
support combined with the ancient African belief in the moral value of
economic redistribution to result in a heavy political stress on the "group
right" of economic welfare. Unfortunately, however, the new African
governments have neither the economic nor the administrative resources
(regardless of political will) to fulfillwelfare demands. Basic communication
and transportation infrastructuresdo not exist, nor does a tax base which
can support complete social security. Human capital resources are scarce,
and the bureaucracy is in its infancy.
What confronts Africa, therefore, is precarious elite rule which can
justify itself and maintain itself in power only by fulfillingat least some of the
massive demands upon it for economic growth, equitable distribution of
wealth, basic welfare servicing, and civil and political freedom; in other
words, for the rapid creation of a society which approximates those of the
Western world today. But how did the Western world itself achieve its enviable human rights position? If Africa is to achieve what the Western world
has achieved, then it must study the methods by which those achievements
came about. Perhapsthe more realisticcomparison to be made, therefore, is
that of late twentieth-century Africawith Western Europe at a similarstage of
economic and political development.
The major tasks which new African states face are twofold. The first is
the political consolidation of a nation-state in the face, especially, of particularistic ethnic loyalties and, in some countries, regional rivalries
heightened by inequitable economic development under British rule. In
comparisons of African with Western human rights, it is often forgotten that
during Europe'sown stage of nation-building, massive violations of what we
would now consider elementary human rights occurred. In Britain and
France, for example, local-language speakers were forced by law and
22. Michael E. Tigar and Madeleine R. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1977).
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violence to adopt the new "national"languages.23Religious wars occurred;
Catholic and Protestant states were carved out; and extreme religious deviants such as the Moors in Spain and the ubiquitous Jews were either
expelled, confined to ghettoes, or murdered. "National"cultures were, in
other words, secured by brute force, in the absence of any moral concern
for freedom of speech, religion, or political participation.
By contrast, African states are faced with the task of forging nations out
of often recalcitrantlocal populations while guaranteeing a host of civil and
political freedoms which allow for local criticisms, participation,and defense
of subnational "group rights."The international and indigenous expectation,
moreover, is that this creation of nationhood should be accomplished literally overnight. To function effectively in the modern internationaleconomy,
Africa must be organized on the basis of definite geographical boundaries;
rules of commerce must apply everywhere within each geographic entity;
and both foreign visitors and urban administratorsexpect to find uniformity
of laws, language, and customs wherever they go. The task of nationbuilding might be slightly easier in Africa if the boundaries presently being
consolidated had emerged from centuries of indigenous political conflict, as
they did in Europe; if, for example, the Ashanti had indeed expanded all
over Ghana and into IvoryCoast and Togo; if the Kenyan Somalis were actually resident in Somalia; if the Buganda kingdom had expanded and conquered the small ethnic groups surrounding it; if northern, western, and
eastern Nigeria had evolved as three different countries. But in Africa, the
ruling elites must forge a sense of nationhood out of artificially imposed
geographical boundaries while facing human rights constraints and
possibilities of international moral censure which were unknown at the time
of the European consolidations.
The second problem which African governments face is that they are
obliged to implement, as soon as possible, a whole range of "new" rights
which were unknown in Europe until the early twentieth century. In the civil
and political realm, they were obliged to grant all of the rightswhich evolved
in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the rightto an
independent judiciary and the right to formal political participation.24But
they are also obliged to grant all of the new twentieth-century rights. For
example, there is pressure upon them to liberalize a whole host of traditional
customs in the direction of individual women's autonomy: 25 this pressure
23. On France, see Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural
France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), chap. 6, "A Wealth of
Tongues."
24. On the granting of basic civil-political rights in Europe, see Robert Justin Goldstein,
"Political Repression and Political Development: The 'Human Rights' Issue in Nineteenth
Century Europe," in Richard F. Thomasson, ed., Comparative Social Research, vol. 4
(Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1981), 161-198.
25. Rhoda Howard, "Human Rights and Personal Law: Women in Sub-SaharanAfrica,"Issue
12 (Spring-Summer 1982), 45-52.
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emanates both from international ideological criticism and from the preferences of urban, westernized elite African women. African governments are
also obliged to grant rightsto refugees and aliens, even though international
obligations toward refugees principally emerged in the period after World
War I26 and even though the refugee burden in Africa is higher than in any
other continent.27The Africanexpulsions of ethnic minorities (such as that of
the Asians from Uganda and Kenya), or indeed of other African aliens (such
as the expulsion of 100,000 people from Ghana in 1970 28), and the expulsion of two million people from Nigeria in 1983 parallel European ethnic
expulsions of earlier times. Unlike Europe, however, Africa has no colonies
to which to send its ethnic minorities or its surplus labor. The insistence on
universality of political rights in Africa, a very late development in the
Western democracies, constitutes a considerable political cost to the new
African nation-states and especially to their new elites.
Finally, African governments have accepted that it is their immediate
obligation to institute economic development (loosely comprising absolute
economic growth, redistribution of wealth, and increased national
autonomy) as soon as possible. They have accepted in principle the entire
burden of the welfare society, as defined not only by the Western capitalist
world, but more comprehensively by socialist Europe; hence, for example,
the right to work, not guaranteed in welfare societies in the West, is
guaranteed in some Africanconstitutions.29 Such economic obligations were
not deemed to be part of the state's duties in Europe until well after national
consolidation had taken place and basic civil and political rights had been
awarded (to men only) after a long period of class struggle. Moreover,
Europe and North America had at their command, when they began to
implement welfare policies, the accumulated wealth of four centuries of
imperialism and industrialization.With far fewer resources, African governments are attempting to implement much more in the way of economic
rights, within a much shorter, indeed a comparatively minuscule, period of
time.
A comparison of human rights in Africa in the 1980s with human rights
in the Western world at similar stages of national consolidation and
26. See Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol. 1 (Leyden: A. W.
Sijthoff, 1966), 9-27, and vol. 2 (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972), 17-23. See also Louise W.
Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, vols. 1 and 2 (Methuen, N.J.: Scarecrow
Press, 1975).
27. Rhoda Howard, "The Canadian Government Response to Africa's Refugee Problem,"
Canadian Journal of African Studies 15 (1981), 95-116.
28. Margaret Peil, "The Expulsion of West African Aliens,"Journalof Modern African Studies 9
(1971), 205-229.
29. The Constitution of Tanzania (1979), "Forward:the Foundations of the Constitution,"section C(IV), states that "every community

has the duty..

. to ensure

that . .

every man

[sic] able to work does work ..." The Constitution of Nigeria (1979), art. 17(3)(a),
specifies that all citizens are to have adequate means of livelihood and "adequate opportunities to secure suitable employment."
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economic development is, then, must more appropriate than a comparison
of Africa with contemporary Western societies. Such sociologically relevant
comparison will reveal the disadvantages under which Africa labors: fewer
resources combined with much higher human rights expectations. With
such a comparison in mind, we can ask what is reasonable to expect of new
African nation-states, rather than merely enumerating the ways in which
Africa has failed to live up to universal or Western ideals of human rights.
COMPARISONWITH AFRICAUNDER COLONIALRULE
A minor variant of the comparison of African human rights with contemporary Western human rightsis the comparison of postcolonial with colonial
Africa. The opinion is sometimes expressed that English-speakingAfricawas
better off, regarding human rights, under Britishrule than it is under indigenous African rule. This position implicitly reflects a concern for political
stability as the overriding priorityof human rights.
It is true that, once Africa had been successfully conquered and all
resistance overcome, British rule was relatively benign. The history of the
conquest itself, however, reveals massive violations of the right to life and
liberty.30 The Britishcould be quite ruthless in their suppression of even the
slightest resistance. For example, Sir Garnet Wolseley, the hero of the 1874
conquest of Ashanti, had the Ashanti capital of Kumasi burned to the
ground.31 In Kenya, another country taken through active warfare, every
person in the market of the village of Murukawas slaughtered in vengeance
for the killing of one British soldier in 1902.32 Recalcitrant chiefs were
routinely exiled (as was the Asantehene, or king, of Ashanti as well as the
Kabakaof Buganda) or detained. The Maxim gun was used in Africaas early
as the 1890s against indigenous Ugandan and Tanzanian resistance.33That
such brutalitywas not confined merely to the nineteenth-century imperialist
phase is evidenced by the massive incarcerations of "Mau Mau" rebels in
Kenya in the 1950s and confinement of Africanwomen and children to "protective" concentration camps.34
Civil and political rights as the contemporary world now defines them
were certainly not practiced under colonial rule; indeed, the Britishresisted
the inclusion of a provision in the Civil-PoliticalCovenant obliging them to
implement those rights in their colonies.35 The practice of preventive deten30. Michael Crowder, ed., West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation (London: Hutchinson, 1971), and Henry S. Wilson, The Imperial Experience in
Sub-SaharanAfrica since 1870 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).
31. Crowder, note 30 above, 42.
32. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Detained: A Writer'sPrison Diary (London: Heinemann, 1981), 35.
33. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Random House, 1975), 88.
34. Ngugi, note 32 above, 49.
35. James Frederick Green, The United Nations and Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institute, 1956), 55-57.
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tion, now a favorite weapon of African governments against their opponents, is a direct heritage of the colonial era 36 carried over from Britishand
colonial law into the independence constitutions.37There was no political
participation to speak of in colonial Africa. A few African members were
allowed into the LegislativeCouncils of Ghana 38 and Sierra Leone 39as early
as the 1920s, but all decisions of such councils could be overridden by the
colonial executive and the colonial secretary. In other countries, admission
of Africans into legislative councils was delayed until the 1940s or 1950s.40
These African members were appointed, not elected (except for a few
municipal seats); thus ordinary Africans had no political rights whatsoever.
Nor was there any real independence of the judiciary. The local districtcommissioner was normally prosecutor, judge, and jury- in short, a benign,
patriarchal "great white father." Only in the higher courts and the urban
areas was separation of judiciary from the other organs of government
established.
In the economic field, the Britishpracticed forced labor until well into
the 1920s.41 During World War I, West Africans forcibly recruited into the
Britisharmy's carrier corps died by the thousands from exhaustion, inadequate provisioning, and unhealthy living conditions.42 Trade unions were
not permitted until the 1920s; and when they did exist, they had very few
rights.43In Kenya, hundreds of thousands of Africans were expelled from
their land to make way for white settlers, and African peasants were forbidden to grow profitable crops, such as coffee, in competition with the
whites.44 Generally speaking, the colonial state assumed no obligation for
36. See Ngugi, note 32 above, 44-51, for a discussion of Kenyan resistance leaders detained
under British rule. For an autobiographical account by a Kenyan detainee, see Josiah
Mwangi Kariuki,"Mau Mau" Detainee (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
37. See James W. Skelton, Jr., "Standardsof Procedural Due Process under International Law
vs. Preventive Detention in Selected African States,"Houston Journal of International Law
2 (Spring 1980), 314, and "Ghana's Preventive Detention Act,"Journalof the International
Commission of Jurists3 (Winter 1961), 71.
38. A. K. P. Kludze, "Ghana [Constitutional History],"in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H.
Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana
Publications, October 1982), 4.
39. W. S. Marcus Jones and G. F. A. Sawyerr, "Sierra Leone [Constitutional History]," in
Blaustein and Flanz, note 38 above (June 1979), 3.
40. For details of each country, see Blaustein and Flanz, note 38 above.
41. On Ghana, see Roger G. Thomas, "Forced Labour in BritishWest Africa:The Case of the
Northern Territoriesof the Gold Coast, 1906-1927," Journal of African History 14 (1973),
79-103; see also the account of forced labor, by A. T. Nzula, I. I. Potekhin, and A. Z.
Zusmanovich, Forced Labour in Colonial Africa (London: Zed Press, 1979; originally
published 1933).
42. David Killingrayand James Matthews, "Beasts of Burden: BritishWest African Carriersin
the FirstWorld War," Canadian journal of African Studies 13 (1979), 5-23.
43. See Nzula, Potekhin, and Zusmanovich, note 41 above, 119; see also Sharon Stichter,
"The Formation of a Working Class in Kenya,"in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen,
eds., The Development of an African Working Class (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1975), 43-44.
44. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: Heinemann,
1973), 208.
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economic development or economic rights until 1939, when the exigencies
of wartime production forced more rational consideration of all British
resources. Nor was there any notion that the Britishshould ensure in their
colonies even the limited range of social welfare provisions which existed at
home.
In the cultural field, the British, perhaps unintentionally, undermined
local pride and dignity by the introduction of Christian churches and
mission-run schools. There African members of a putative urban elite
learned to imitate whites in dress and manner, and to denigrate their own
cultural heritage. Culturaldiffusion, in which Africansmight have made their
own choices about which aspects of Western mores they wished to adopt,
was accompanied by cultural compulsion; the price of schooling was conversion to Christianity. Newly Westernized "young men" challenged the
authority of their elders, while the relatively high status of women in indigenous Africansocieties was eroded by the imposition of Western patriarchal
ideals. In defense of the British, it can be said that African languages were
not formally abolished, nor were indigenous religions disallowed (except
when their provisions, e.g., infanticide of twins or trial by ordeal, were
deemed contrary to "naturaljustice"45).Yet racial discrimination was commonplace. Indeed, Jomo Kenyatta,then Presidentof Kenya, could still rouse
a cheer from the popular masses in the 1970s by explaining that the African
elite now owned the best land, shops, and homes, formerly for whites
only.46
This short description of human rights under Britishrule serves to illustrate that the colonial power was not concerned to grant to its colonial subjects the rights of citizens in the mother country, even given the limited
definition of human rightswhich prevailed at the time. What the Britishdid
do during the colonial period was to eliminate all overt interethnic conflict;
to abolish, where it existed, Africandomestic slavery; and to stop the expansion of African empires. Thus a great deal of political conflict which might
have occurred in a noncolonized Africa was deflected, only to emerge, in
sometimes more violent form, in the postcolonial period. Although
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ashanti expansionism seems to have
been completely quelled by Britishrule in Ghana, the smaller ethnic groups'
fears of Buganda power in Uganda have been a prime cause of the intense
postcolonial civil conflict. In Nigeria, the power of the northern Islamic
empires was temporarily checked by Britishrule, only to emerge after 1960
against the challenge of the new Westernized Igbo with their dominant positions in trade, the professions, and the bureaucracy.
45. All Africa Council of Churches, "FactorsResponsible for the Violation of Human Rights in
Africa, Issues 6 (Winter 1976), 44, and David Westerlund, "Freedom of Religion under
Socialist Rule in Tanzania,"Journal of Church and State 24 (Winter 1982), 93.
46. "The President's Kenyatta Day Speech: Warning to Opponents" (reported on Radio
Nairobi, 20 October 1972), Africa Contemporary Record 5 (1972-73), C128.
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To compare human rights in contemporary Africa unfavorably with
human rights in the colonial period, therefore, is to concentrate on a very
limited range of "rights,"namely, peace, relative predictability, and "benign
neglect" of indigenous ethnic groupings. In a country as wracked by internal
tensions as Uganda has been since 1969, such elementary rights are valued
indeed; the Britishdid not murder individuals merely on the basis of their
ethnicity, and once their conquest was assured, peace did reign within the
narrow confines of paternalistic dictatorship. But were the British still in
power today, the narrowness of the range of rights they allowed and
planned for would be even more obvious than it was during the nationalist
agitation of the 1950s and 1960s. The new states of postcolonial Africa have
assumed responsibility for massive development and social welfare programs; programs undreamed of during colonial rule. Their failure to implement these programs causes political unrest which often results in state
repression. Such repression may not differ in degree from that practiced by
the British, but it does differ in kind. More is expected of independent
African governments by way of civil and political rights than was ever
expected of the British;thus the independent governments' attacks on those
rights appear, to the internal and the international observer, much worse
than the Britishoutright denial of them.
COMPARISONSWITH PRECOLONIALAFRICA
Several Africanwriters47contend that there is a uniquely Africanconcept of
human rights, that is, that concepts of human rights are culturally specific,
not universal. Hence the Universal Declaration of Human Rightscannot be
applied to the African continent without substantial modification, despite
the Organization of African Unity's having endorsed the Declaration and
despite the standard list of human rights and fundamental freedoms
included in many African constitutions.48 To support their contention, these
writers refer to a model of precolonial African society which, they maintain,
is still the backbone of African ways of thinking and of African social organi47. See especially Dunstan M. Wai, "Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Adamantia
Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds., Human Rights:Culturaland Ideological Perspectives (New
York: Praeger, 1979), 116-118; Asmarom Legesse, "Human Rights in African Political
Culture," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A
World Survey (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 125-128; and Chris
C. Mojekwu, "InternationalHuman Rights:The African Perspective,"in Jack L. Nelson and
Vera M. Green, eds., International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues (Stanfordville,
N.Y.: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980), 85-87. [Editor'snote: but see Okere, note
14 above.]
48. E.g., Constitutions of Gambia (1970), Ghana (1979), Kenya (1969), Nigeria (1979), Sierra
Leone (1978), Uganda (1967), and Zambia (1973), in Blaustein and Flanz, note 38 above.
The Tanzanian (1977) and Malawian (1966) Constitutions do not list fundamental rights
and freedoms.
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zation, even in the modernized economic sectors and urban areas. I call this
model of precolonial African society the communitarian ideal.49
The communitarian ideal asserts that African social organization differed, and still differs, from the Western world in three crucial respects. The
first is that people do not think of themselves as individuals, nor do they
worry about individual rights; rather, personhood is attained by fulfilling
one's role in the community, and people are more concerned with group,
especially ethnic-cultural, than with individual rights.50The second respect is
that political decisions are made through group consensus, the chief consulting the elders who in turn represent the people; hence the competitive
model of party politics is inappropriateand the concept of "loyalopposition"
is incomprehensible; all loyal members are part of the group and opponents
are by definition not loyal. The final respect in which Africansocial organization differs from the Western is economic: in precolonial and present-day
Africa, wealth is automatically redistributed;there is no concept of private
property, and the wealthy man is respected only if he shares his good fortune with his kin and coethnics.
It is true that in many of the relatively homogeneous, undifferentiated
simple societies of precolonial Africa, both economic and political "rights"
were guaranteed, at least at the local level, by communal structures. Obligations to family and kin ensured sharing of resources, however scarce. Land
was distributed on the basis of need: even domestic slaves were allocated
land to support themselves. Even after a great deal of social change, this pattern of resource distribution and family-based sharing continues in contemporary Africa. Nepotistic corruption and patron-client relations are a form of
wealth-sharing; national and local governments' resources are distributed by
government or bureaucratic officials along ascriptive kin, ethnic, and
language criteria. Wealthier urban migrants remit earnings to their families
and invest in self-help projects in rural areas. Redistributionof resources is
still a potent social ideal.
Similarlyon the civil and political level, many of the nondifferentiated,
ethnically homogeneous societies of rural Africa had effective means for
guaranteeing what is now known as human rights. In those societies in
which centralized state structures had not evolved before European conquest, chiefs were selected by and were accountable to tribal elders; and
large, village-level meetings in which free speech was allowed were com49. I discuss this ideal thoroughly in Rhoda Howard, "IsThere an African Concept of Human
Rights?"; Working Paper no. A:8, Development Studies Programme, University of
Toronto; also in R. J. Vincent, ed., Human Rights and Sovereignty: Issues and Responses
(under review by George Allen and Unwin, London).
50. Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, "Personand Community in African TraditionalThought," in RichardA.
Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d. ed. (Washington, D.C.: University
Press of America, 1979), 157-168.
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monplace.51 The courts operated on the basis of common sense morality
rather than formal legal procedures; 52 this was an effective means of
regulating social relations in societies in which all individuals were known to
the judges and in which the question to be resolved in a trial was normally
not whether the accused had committed a crime, but rather what his just
punishment should be.
The existence of these indigenous political and legal structures, which
do indeed guarantee fair play, is often invoked by African political leaders to
justify their own national political practices. For example, Tanzania refers
back to the consensual model of politics to justify reliance on political
mobilization and discussion within a single political party ratherthan having
a formally competitive multipartysystem. Malawi justifies its use of so-called
TraditionalCourts, which disallow defense attorneys even though the courts
exercise the power of capital punishment in murder and treason trials,53 by
referringback to indigenous models of community-based, relatively informal
systems of popular justice. The new Rawlings regime in Ghana (1982- )
uses a similar justification for its new People's Courts54even though some
critics maintain that the judges in these new courts are not traditional chiefs
and elders, but rather young pro-Rawlingsthugs.55
Elsewhere I have criticized in some depth 56 the elevation of Africa's
communitarian social structureto a unique ideal of human rights. The communal society does not exist in urban areas and is increasingly breaking
down in the rural areas as well, as national political culture evolves and as
economic resources, especially land, become more and more scarce. Constant references to communal society can be, and are, used to mask
systematic violations of human rights in the interests of ruling elites.
Moreover, the picture of precolonial African social relations on which
the communal model is based is inaccurate even regarding the past. Some
African societies, such as the Northern Nigerian Emirates and Buganda,
were actually powerful empires in which there was social stratification
51. See, for example, the account by K. A. Busia of Ashanti practices, in his Africa in Search of
Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1967), 22-30.
52. On traditional African legal systems, see James C. N. Paul, "Human Rights and Legal
Development: Observations on Some African Experiences," in James C. Tuttle, ed., International Human Rights Law and Practice (Chicago: American Bar Association, August
1978), 23-37.
53. "Malawi- Criminal Jurisdiction," The Review of the International Commission of Jurists
(March 1970), 6-7, and "Malawi,"id. (June 1982), 13-14. See also various Amnesty International reports on Malawi, e.g., Amnesty International, Bulletin (Canada) (March 1977).1
54. See West Africa, various 1982 reports, including "People's Court at Work" (18 October
1982), 2703, 2705-06, and "Bar'sBoycott [of People's Courts] Bites" (25 October 1982),
2772-75.
55. Communique issued by the Ghana Catholic Bishop's Conference (Wa, Upper Region;
5-10 July 1982), reprinted in The Standard (Accra) (1 August 1982), 4.
56. Howard, note 49 above.
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among nobles, freemen, and slaves and in which political structures were
relatively authoritarian. More to the point, the model now applies only to
those hinterland parts of African countries which are still relatively
unintegrated into the peripheral capitalist economy. National economic
policies are based more and more on individual acquisition of wealth;
political decisions are made more and more by elites with only ritualistic
consultation of the masses; and people think of themselves more and more
as individualswith varying wants and needs, not merely as members of their
natal ethnic groups or villages.
Some African scholars present the communitarian ideal as a model of
social relations which is specifically African in content; thus they argue for
cultural specificity on a racial or regional basis. In fact, however, the model
is not confined to Africa; rather, it represents typical agrarian, precapitalist
social relations in nonstate societies. It would be useful, for example, to
compare such African societies with preindustrialEngland. Undoubtedly, in
the closed-village societies of premodern Europe, we would also discover
that people thought of themselves more as members of their own local
groups than as individuals, finding a sense of identity by fulfilling their
assigned roles rather than by fulfilling"themselves."A counterpoint to the
feeling of belongingness would be hostility to strangers, such as outside
traders or Jews, just as it is in African societies with their "Zongos," or
strangers'quarters. In the feudal system, the lords took some responsibility
for storage of grain and protection from famine, just as the chiefs were
responsible for redistributingfood and allocating land in precolonial Africa.
I do not wish to stretch the comparison too far: feudal Europe and
precolonial Africa are not altogether arialagous. The point, however, is that
both were relatively simple social structures. What some writers view as
essentially different African and Western social structuresand ways of thinking are actually differences between relatively simple and relativelycomplex
societies."7 In simple societies, there is little social stratification,so that it is
easy to have consensual decision-making and redistributionof wealth; there
are no economic classes competing against each other for scarce resources.
Moreover, social roles are undifferentiated;the villagerwho fulfillshis role as
husband is also fulfillinghis role as farmer and as respected man in the community. But in more complex societies the roles of husband, economic man,
and political man are differentiated; and the individual is likely to compartmentalize himself, having different associational ties for each role. Thus in
politics he has more than one interest and cannot easily rely on a community leader to express all his interests for him. Finally, in more complex
societies, the different functions of authority, such as law, government,
57. The sociological originator of the distinction between simple and complex societies is
Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York:The Free Press, 1933; 1st
ed. 1893).
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police, defense, administration, education, and social welfare, are compartmentalized and bureaucratized. The individual is confronted with new
organizations operating by impersonal rule, not by friendly personal contact.
His own life becomes compartmentalized insofar as he must deal with different institutionsfor different aspects of his needs and wants. Modern man,
then, becomes individualized, fragmented, and cut off from community
ties.18

Thus comparison with precolonial Africa is of limited use, if any, insofar
as it purports to provide us with an alternative, culturally specific model of
human rights indigenous to Africa or Africans. It is useful, however, as a
reminder of the kind of society in which many ruralAfricansstill live, despite
the increasing institutional ubiquity of the centralized modern state and of
the kind of society in which many urban and rural elite Africans still have
very real roots. The elite spokesperson who maintains that Africans are not
so competitive, profit-seeking, and individualistic as North Americans may
be correct, not because Africans are African but because their social organization is still less complex and less institutionallydifferentiated than that of
the Western industrialworld. To base human rights policy on this model of
ruralAfrica, however, is to ignore the changes which have occurred and are
occurring in the way Africans live, in particular how their lives are affected
by all those institutionsthat the state controls. Under such new social conditions, new methods of guaranteeing human rights become essential. Comparison with precolonial society is useful insofar as it explains the cultural
and psychological roots of modern African man, but it is not useful if it is
taken as a factual description of contemporary African social organization.
CONCLUSION
I began this article by suggesting that commentators on human rights in
Africa, or indeed anywhere in the world, need to be aware of the implicit
comparisons they make regardingguarantees, implementations, and abuses
of human rights. It is importantto be aware and critical of one's implicit comparisons.
The use of comparisons themselves, however, is not only a legitimate
but indeed, I would contend, a necessary part of analyzing human rights.
Ultimately, human rightspractices are based not in law or philosophy, but in
real social relations. Such social relations vary across time and place, across
history and culture. By looking at human rightsin a comparative framework,
one can obtain a sense of how human rights practices can or may change:
one can predict what human rightsviolations may be remedied or may arise,
58. See Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
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ratherthan merely engage in static description or in post hoc analysis. Comparisons ought to be historical, not merely in a temporal but, more importantly, in a social sense. Social chronology implies comparing societies at
similar stages of development. This does not mean that one ought to be an
evolutionist, assuming that all societies evolve through exactly the same
stages in an orderly, and inevitable, progression. It does mean that one
ought to try to compare societies with similar levels of wealth or in similar
stages of economic development, taking into account also similaritiesin the
level of national consolidation and institution-building.
An historical sense also means that one will be aware that no society is
static. The harkening back to precolonial Africathat is typical of a number of
Africans commenting on human rights in their own continent implies an
essentially ahistorical approach. All societies change. Africa, as a result of
five centuries of incorporation into the world economy and one century of
colonial conquest and control, has changed more than most. To present a
static picture of communal relations which may have existed in some parts
of Africa before contact with Europe began, as a model for contemporary
human rights in Africa, is to deny history completely.
Historical comparisons must be combined with a sense of social structure. Whether one compares societies at the same or different times, one is
comparing social structures. Contentions that human rights beliefs are
specific to particular places (the West, Africa) should not be interpreted as
evidence of differing racial or geographical philosophies. Rather,they represent the reflection of different social structures in different belief systems.
Although parallels between different social entities can never be exact, we
can find substantial similarities in human rights beliefs and practices in the
simple, nondifferentiated societies of premodern Europe and precolonial
Africa.The communal model of social relations, insofaras it actually exists, is
not unique to Africa.
In insistingon the necessity of historicallyand structurallyaccurate comparisons, however, I do not mean to deny the independent role of ideas and
ideals in shaping any society's view of human rights. People can and do act
independently of history. Any prediction based on social scientific analysis
can fall flat because of how people act, and how people act is often determined by the ideas they hold dear, even when those ideas may seem inappropriate, in a scientific sense, to their time and place. In Africathe independent role of ideas is more obvious than in Europe. Whereas Europe has been
an originator of modern ideologies, Africa has been to a large extent a
(sometimes unwilling) recipient. African politicians, philosophers, and
lawyers have all been influenced by the Christian religion and by liberal
political and judicial ideals which the Britishintroduced into their colonies,
even when the Britishpractice fell far short of Britain'sown ideals. In more
recent times, African intellectuals and other members of the elite have been
influenced by both the socialist view of human rightsand the emerging inter-
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national consensus on human rights reflected in the various U.N. standards
as well as in Africa's own Rights Charter. Ideas, transformed into fact by
human actors endowed with free will, can challenge and overcome both
structuralconstraints and historical "inevitability."
Individualsare not, of course, mere agents of history or victims of social
structure, nor are they mere implementers of ideas. Individuals are also
selfish human beings, who normally act in a rational manner calculated to
achieve their own self-interest. In some societies, including many in
precolonial Africa, an individual's self-interest is perceived to be best
guaranteed by conformity to group norms and by acting in concern with the
group. But in contemporary Africa, in rural as well as urban areas, it is
increasingly the case that the individual both separates himself from the
group and can no longer rely on a particulargroup leader to represent him
in the multiplicity of his relations with the modern economy and the new
state structure. He then begins to represent himself in the new competitive
economic and political marketplace. Inevitably, a few individuals rise to the
top in this new competitive society.
In Africa, as elsewhere, therefore, new elites are forming as hundreds of
millions of individuals pursue their own self-interest. There is nothing new or
surprisingabout this; all historicaland structuralcomparisons will lead to the
conclusion that in all but the most primitive of societies, social stratification
occurs and elites dominate. In the African as in all other contexts, the existence of elites implies the possibility of elite manipulations of human rightsin
their own interests. Such elites may enunciate a specifically "African"theory
of human rights merely as a legitimizing ideology,59 a cover for their own
interests. Thus, for example, the denial of a concept of loyal opposition in
Africancultural history can become an excuse for holding political dissidents
in preventive detention.
The use of historical and structuralcomparisons can assist the analyst in
separating what is actually possible from what is merely the ideal in the practice of human rights. This is an important distinction to make, especially in
newly independent, poor countries such as English-speakingsub-Saharan
Africa. But men make history, and elites can control men. Scientific comparisons may be used as explanations, but should never be used as excuses,
for human rightsabuses. The Nigerian writer Wole Soyinka speaks of "power
morality."60 Power morality is undoubtedly the most enduring enemy of real
human rights, in Africa as elsewhere.
59. Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Harlow: Longman, 1981), 180.
60. Wole Soyinka, The Man Died (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 90.

